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revolutions, 7 on the review of the weaving paradigm, 8 on the analysis of constitutions
and the status of laws, and 9 on the final description of the science and the work of the
statesman as weaver.
Through these frequent dives to the microscopic level, and despite the author’s
expressed refusal to “break up the text” (22), the book is reminiscent of the type of
sustained and astute commentary that might accompany a translation. Moreover, El Murr
often reproduces passages (up to a Stephanus page in length) to comment on structure,
vocabulary and syntax, translation alternatives, the establishment of the text, proposed
interpretations of other commentators, and much else.
In addition to its scholarly virtues, one of the main strengths of this commentary is to
remind the contemporary reader of the presence of many provocative elements in the
Statesman, especially if one considers the historical period’s “horizon of expectations.” More
than anywhere else, Plato arouses the reader’s thoughts in the Statesman by showing familiar
realities in an entirely new light. This strength is particularly noticeable in the explanations
devoted to the definition of man as a featherless biped, to the quasi-ethnological description
of weaving, and to the very detailed examination of the analysis of the law and of existing
constitutions.
The writing style is relatively clear; readers with a good command of written French
should not experience any particular obstacles. However, the typical French interpretative
style—consisting in subtly suggesting with esprit de finesse rather than explaining in a
geometric style—is more likely to confuse the English-speaking reader. Passages where the
author states that a situation or line of reasoning is “clear,” “absolutely obvious,” “evident,” or
“indisputable,” almost inevitably indicate the presence of obscurity or considerable difficulty.
Annie Larivée
Carleton University

Christopher Bruell. Aristotle as Teacher: His Introduction to a Philosophical Science. South Bend:
St. Augustine’s Press, 2014. Pp. viii + 268. Cloth, $37.50.
This commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics is in a style familiar from the writings of Leo
Strauss and his students. The reader is presented with a paraphrase of the whole of Aristotle’s
text, marked by seemingly odd omissions, emphases, and offhand remarks. One soon sees
that the book is written in code. Only as the book progresses (and, presumably, the too
casual reader has been shaken off) is the author (a little) more explicit concerning what
he takes to be the main lines of Aristotle’s esoteric teaching, which (I think, but am not
sure) is as follows.
Aristotle writes the Metaphysics for students being initiated into philosophy. These students
have already left behind a mythical world-view, but not all are ready to grasp Aristotle’s
deepest teachings concerning the nature of reality and how it is to be understood. Aristotle
distinguishes between an arché (principle) and an aition (cause). The true principles, the
realities behind all things, are particular bits of elemental material stuff in motion. These
are the ousiai, the substances. But in order to make sense of the world, as it presents itself to
us, we need to identify causes, by employing logoi. These logoi enable us to group together
things on account of certain similarities. They express the ousiai of things. (The ousia of
a thing is not, strictly speaking, among the ousiai.) These groups are the kinds discussed
by the sciences. Identifying them allows us to navigate the world of “what is manifest to
us” (195) and give us whatever knowledge of beings is humanly possible, though such
knowledge necessarily is unable to grasp a good deal concerning the beings in question.
Bruell understands Aristotle’s assertion at Z.8 1033b26–28 (that the forms as some
describe them, as apart from particulars, are of no use concerning the comings-to-be
of substances) not according to the usual understanding, according to which he refers
to Platonic, separate Forms, but to the substantial forms he himself appeals to in his
hylomorphic analyses of particular substances (150). Such forms are causes, appealed to in
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explanation, but are not true principles. Bruell has Aristotle break with the Parmenidean
principle that the real is the intelligible: “There is a sort of principle that makes something
known or knowable, without bearing the first or fundamental responsibility for either its
coming to be or its (persisting in) being” (86).
First philosophy, as Aristotle describes it, the study of being as being, is impossible. A
fortiori, first philosophy considered as theology is likewise impossible. Aristotle writes his
Metaphysics for dual audiences: those who can appreciate his deepest teachings, and those
who cannot. Each sees in the text what is appropriate for it to see. The more discerning
reader will see that Aristotle is not “so devout an Aristotelian as some of his followers were
and are” (140).
Bruell points to familiar philosophical tensions between Aristotle’s insistence that
substances are particulars and that substances are the objects of (universal) scientific
knowledge. While most Aristotle scholars develop complex accounts to reconcile these
tensions, for Bruell, they indicate that Aristotle rejects certain premises he explicitly
advocates.
Some will find Bruell’s readings brilliant and deep, others (myself included) willfully
perverse. Could such an approach ever be validated for those outside of Bruell’s own
intellectual tradition? Perhaps. Bruell finds significance in the ways in which Metaphysics K
reworks earlier material from the Metaphysics. On his account the book is for those students
unable to fully fathom the esoteric dimension of the earlier books of the Metaphysics, and—
oblivious to their hints and implicit arguments—think that a study of being as being is
possible. This is why the book is a suitable bridge to the theological Book Λ. Here, one might
be able to test Bruell’s interpretation. Of the many slight variations in expression found
in K, how many can be understood as advocating the sort of metaphysics that, according
to Bruell, the perceptive reader of the earlier books would see to be impossible? Suppose
that the overwhelming majority of differences in Aristotle’s exposition do show him to be
glossing over the sorts of difficulties and hesitations that Bruell finds in the earlier books.
This would demand explanation: if not that provided by an esoteric reading, then another.
I did not do this work of collating and classifying the differences, but it is there to be done.
It is itself of some philosophical interest that this sort of uncompromising “Straussian”
approach to the history of philosophy has persisted for so long as a force in education and
scholarship, in the face of indifference and even hostility from mainstream scholars. Such
a take on the Metaphysics of Aristotle might seem to be a reduction ad absurdum, but Bruell
has given us one, and has pulled it off with finesse.
Owen Goldin
Marquette University

Devin Henry and Karen Margrethe Nielsen, editors. Bridging the Gap between Aristotle’s Science
and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. xiv + 304. Cloth, $110.00.
Most of the essays in this excellent collection give clear and persuasive arguments about
difficult topics, and several break new ground. They are demanding but accessible to the
non-specialist, with all Greek transliterated and translated; footnotes send the specialist
reader to other published works where the case for a point is made in more technical detail.
The book’s stated aim casts a wide net: “to expose some of the ways in which the received
view has overestimated the gap Aristotle sees between science and ethics and suggest some
possible avenues for bridging that gap” (4), and the essays are divided into three naturally
distinct sections. The essays of part 1 make the case that Aristotle’s ethics resembles, or
is, a science to a greater degree than is commonly thought—and that for all Aristotle’s
emphasis on the distinction between theoretical and practical inquiries, there is much to
be learned about each from careful consideration of their similarities. The essays of part 2
characterize the method of ethical inquiry. They show that Aristotle employs more than one
such method; and they offer several interpretations of these methods—interpretations that

